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PREFACE
To develop this work I have taken as a theoretical framework the Clausewitzian concept of the "Remarkable Trinity", which assisted me as a useful reference to approach this question. The Colombian case is a good example of how this concept has not been considered, and incorrect strategies were applied in this country during the past decades. This paper explains the role played in Colombia by each one of the actors of the trinity: the people, the armed forces, and the government. Likewise, it explains how a new strategy has taken into account the balance among these actors and has been applied by the current Colombian Administration, obtaining outstanding results thus far in a short period of time. The Colombian experience during the last eighteen months not only has brought a new hope for a solution to the most complex conflict in the Americas, but also demonstrates that Clausewitz's ideas still are appropriate references today for strategists worldwide.
In his book On War, Clausewitz refers that in war as a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make it a remarkable trinity. This trinity is composed of: 1) violence, hatred and enmity, that mainly concerns the people; 2) the play of chance and probability, that concerns the commander and his army; and 3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, that concerns the government. The theory of the trinity considers clearly three elements: emotion, chance and rational policy. Furthermore, it connects each element with its respective human actors: the people, the army, and the government. In other words, taking together both elements and actors, it means that in war, whether limited or total, it is necessary to maintain equilibrium between them. Thus, the feelings of the population, the professional qualities of the army, and the policy of the government must be articulated in a well-balanced strategy that allows the nation to achieve its national security objectives.
Viewed from another perspective, the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity are implicit within the elements of national power, except for economic. The informational or social element of power is directed to impact the feelings of the people. The military refers to the potential of the armed forces. The diplomatic or political element considers the power of the government. Therefore, if strategy is defined as a calculated relationship among ends, ways, and means, in any war situation a successful strategy has to integrate efficiently the elements of national power (military, diplomatic, economic and informational) , that encompasses the elements of the trinity.
The "Remarkable Trinity" is not an isolated concept. It needs to be related in the whole spectrum of war. If war is an instrument of policy, then policy ought to address a wise strategy that considers the best use of means and ways to achieve the strategic ends of the nation. In this context, the people, the army and the government in a synchronized effort must play an equally significant part by balancing human emotions, military creativity and rational policy. Disregarding these factors or ignoring their links will destabilize any state's war endeavor.
The Colombian experience confirms this theory. A country facing a security threat with the people, government and the army moving in different directions, facilitates gains by its enemy, and puts in serious risk its existence as democratic nation. The leadership of the government with a comprehensible strategy, supported by the population and the talent of military forces, achieved outstanding results in less than two years. It is too early to predict that the new Colombian strategy is the panacea to this complex crisis. However, Colombia is viii sensing the "light at the end of tunnel". Succeeding will require continuity in the long term, a great deal of patience, and the solution of deeply rooted political, social and economic causes that underlie this conflict.
While the situation in Colombia remains unsolved, the words of the Prussian soldier remain timely as a prophecy: "A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless". 
"AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR COLOMBIA: A POTENTIAL END TO THE CURRENT CRISIS"
"The country only wants the destruction of terrorism, the control of coexistence and the victory of democracy. We must listen to this resounding voice of opinion, take it as an order and honor it".
President Alvaro Uribe's speech to the military, Bogotá, December 2003.
The Colombian conflict has motivated hundreds of researches, analysis, and studies attempting to explain its complexities by applying the knowledge of diverse branches of thinking or through the prism of different ideological perspectives. It has attracted the attention of the international community due to its unique characteristics, and the fact that it continues as the primary unresolved insurgency in the Western Hemisphere. Despite the post-Cold War optimism that facilitated the demobilization of most insurgent groups, the Colombian conflict showed an opposite pattern that witnessed the increasing intensity of the struggle. New ways to fight, increasing illegal organizations, and sophisticated sources of financing brought about a complex scenario that made it much more difficult to achieve a feasible solution to the conflict. This paper doesn't intend to explain either the Colombian problem or its appropriate solution. I would like to portray a realistic image, describing the efforts that my country has undertaken to find a reasonable exit to the labyrinth of violence and uncertainty that unlawful groups have created to satisfy their illegitimate purposes. Also, I would like to clarify with these ideas that Colombia is not a failing or failed state as some respectable authors have suggested.
Havoc and chaos have been the ideal goals of terrorists groups, but these aren't adequate words to describe the Colombian panorama. Denying the realities of the problem is as illogical as exaggerating its magnitude. After decades of resisting all kinds of cruelty and pain, one truth has been demonstrated: the character of the Colombian people is above the capacity of its enemies to destroy.
ROOTS OF THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT
In Colombia, since the bloody period known as La Violencia 2 , communist-oriented guerrilla groups have been active since the mid-1960s. The largest group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), was established in 1964. The second largest group, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), was established in 1966. These groups expanded slowly until the 1980s, applying the tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare.
Since the 1980s, the conflict has added two new phenomena: the emergence of illegal organizations known as self-defense groups, or paramilitaries 3 , and the collaboration of guerrillas and paramilitaries with drug cartels. In several geographic areas, both guerrillas and self-defense groups gradually eliminated and displaced drug traffickers, obtaining through the illegal drug trade the resources they needed to intensify their struggle.
In the 1990's, terrorism entered this violent scenario and gave the illegal groups a psychological weapon to intimidate the people with a menu of atrocities: kidnapping, extortion, assassination, massacres, bombings, attacks on towns, blowing up oil pipelines and energy towers, etc., trying to impose control by terror in some regions. 4 By 2002, guerrillas increased their numbers to nearly 20,000 members and self-defense forces to 12,000. The impact of this conflict has seriously affected the security in the country, limiting the authority of the government to control some portions of Colombian territory, and eroding its economy and society.
The problem of violence and security in Colombia increased because the state lacked leadership to integrate a strategy that addressed the political, economic, military, and social dynamics of the conflict. Despite several attempts to resolve the situation, none was able to effectively synchronize the capacity of government, people and the armed forces in a unified effort to deal with this threat. However, this situation changed in 2002, when a strategy was developed that finally integrated them.
Since the mid 1960's, when the insurgency problem emerged in Colombia, the people, the government and the military have taken different approaches. The following paragraphs detail the main characteristics of each's historical role in the conflict.
THE PEOPLE
The attitude of the Colombian people can be divided into three periods: Indifference, Coexistence and Rejection. These periods have been determined according to the level of impact by illegal groups on the civilian population.
Indifference was the attitude during the 1960's and 1970's, when guerrilla groups were emerging and expanding, as their actions were generally concentrated in isolated regions of the national territory. The framework of the Cold War helped lead the people to perceive communist groups as messianic organizations, particularly among some sectors of the poor, students and leftist parties. In the urban areas, the problem was seen as a peripheral matter, and people acted as would a neutral spectator watching a football game. The results of the struggle were remote from their interests; only peasants in the countryside were directly affected by the violent situation.
Coexistence came in the 1980's; at that time guerrillas groups achieved considerable ability to disrupt the country. Their illegal actions approached the main cities, far beyond the peasant population. Then, farmers, ranchers, businessmen, industrialists and landowners became targets of guerrillas, who asked them for economical support and that they not denounce the guerrillas to the authorities for their criminal activities. To combat the situation, most of the affected people tried to obtain the guerrillas' consent by paying extortion money, ransoms, and supporting them with logistical activities. Silence with the authorities on guerrilla movements was an extra "charge". Some people decided to confront the problem by creating and supporting self-defense groups to counter the growing threat.
Rejection started in the 1990's when indiscriminate terrorist actions spread throughout Colombia and the civilian population was the focus of the attacks. This environment convinced the people that guerrillas posed a significant threat. The bitter reality quickly showed: "Guerrillas were nothing but organized criminals, murderers, drug traffickers, kidnappers, extortionists and power hungry demagogues deserving no political legitimacy". 5 The feelings of civil society changed from disinterest to a decisive desire to support an initiative that confronted this threat once and for all. In 2002, the FARC ("Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia"), the biggest narcoterrorist group in Colombia, achieved its maximum strength with 7 "blocs", divided into 66 "fronts", and had almost 16,500 members. Its terrorist actions affected the entire Colombian territory. Civilian authorities considered insurgency as a problem of public order. The responsibility was left to the military, which had to deal with the issue without a coordinated national security policy. Consequently, military operations were at the core of the strategy, and there were few initiatives to carry out solutions other than military 6 , based on a sense of distrust of political leaders toward the armed forces and the lack of leadership to generate popular support.
Without a clear strategy, the intensity of conflict grew and the army was lured into the scheme of a protracted popular war, the type of warfare suited to guerrillas. With this panorama the "Vietnam Syndrome" infected the troops: tactical results prevailed over strategic objectives; patrols and raids were conducted instead of coordinated operations at strategic level; maintenance of public order prevailed instead of decisive war; the number of casualties measured unit success. For the draftees, all of these aspects created the mentality that to come back home alive was the principal objective. This resulted in a deterioration of military prestige as well as a loss in credibility for the Colombian Government.
The lessons learned brought into military institutions a self-instituted series of reforms and modernization in the late 1990's. Today, the results on the battlefield have reduced the capacity of terrorist groups while gaining the confidence of the population in the military. However, the cost of this conflict has been very high; thousands have given their lives to bring hope to future generations of Colombians.
THE GOVERNMENT
As a long-standing traditional democratic system, the Colombian National Government has executive, legislative and judicial branches. The president acts as chief of state, head of government, supreme administrative authority, and supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic. The president is elected for a four-year term and cannot be re-elected.
The lack of continuity in government policies has been the main obstacle to implementing long-term strategies. Every four years a new Colombian Government has established its own plan, normally disregarding or distancing itself from the previous administration. During As part of the integral strategy, strengthening the judicial system gained importance as a way of combating impunity and illegality in order to promote peaceful, legitimate conflict resolution mechanisms. Over the last ten years, Colombia has been transforming its legal system into an accusatory system. In this regard, Plan This campaign paid off and the image of the military was undermined; fortunately, with the military reform came a response that brought the truth to light. Now military institutions are strengthened in their legitimacy, truthfulness, and are able to win the war to facilitate the peace. 21 Likewise, they are integrated into national development programs and into the wellbeing of the community. They are transparent, have a sense of identity, high morale and a high degree of ethical conduct.
Principles and values have been an important element of this process. The principles adhered to by the Colombian military forces are: 1) respect for the constitution and law; 2) ethics in all acts; 3) respect for others; 4) commitment to the nation; and 5) professional competence.
The values intrinsic in the military are: 1) honesty, 2) valor, 3) loyalty, 4) honor, and 5) prudence. 22 Those who neglect these principles and values are retired, punished under the disciplinary code, or otherwise brought to justice.
A NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The Colombian military forces designed a new vision of operations with emphasis on mobility and rapid reaction, improvement of the collection and processing of information, development of an integrated communications system, and integration of air power in support of ground operations. This new operational concept is based on the implementation of new doctrine, strengthening of training, improved planning efficiency, better capacity to react day and night, and an increased capability of responsive and agile air support.
Mobility, mass and flexibility are the keys to the Colombian military strategy. The Air Force and Army Aviation are now able to conduct night operations using night-vision equipment that have brought major improvement in the employment of air power, integrating operations effectively with the land forces. By moving troops quickly, anywhere and anytime, the Colombian military has neutralized the guerrillas' operational and tactical advantages. Mobility means deploying forces rapidly and safely by air, avoiding guerrillas that ambush the troops and mine the roads that military convoys must cross to reach combat areas.
The creation of the Rapid Deployment Force in December 1999 initiated this process. This unit, composed of three mobile brigades and a Special Forces brigade, consolidates a striking force of some 5,000 troops that can be deployed anywhere in Colombia. Despite the fact that the force still has insufficient air transport resources, it has conducted the most successful operations to date throughout the country, becoming a source of pride for the population.
As a maxim of combat, before carrying out an operation, commanders in all levels must fulfill three basic elements: "accurate intelligence, excellent planning and correct leadership."
This simple phrase sums up the new culture exhibited by the Colombian military that has brought a chain of continuous successes on the battlefield.
MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence collection has improved with better training and equipment. The activation of the Joint Intelligence Center, the installation of air platforms with a signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability, the acquisition of recognition aircraft and the installation of radars have facilitated the integration of communication systems of air intelligence and land-based units.
A critical factor has been human intelligence (HUMINT) because the guerrillas exploited their familiarity with the terrain and with local networks of social control. This disadvantage has been diminished gradually by implementing the "Town Soldiers Program" (that complemented the return of the National Police to the municipalities that had no previous Police Presence) and the government plan "Red de Cooperantes" (cooperative network). The latter is a network of one million volunteers that support military authorities with information about guerrilla activities.
BETTER LOGISTICS STRUCTURE AND HUMAN TALENT
Logistics has been reinforced in combat service support (CSS) capabilities to meet the requirements of land, sea, river, and air units. Logistics is now able to respond to the 
DEFINITION OF CENTERS OF GRAVITY
One of the biggest challenges in asymmetric warfare is to define friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COG) . No doubt that legitimacy is the Colombian armed forces' friendly COG.
It gives popular support, budget allocation, favorable political decisions, confidence and credibility.
When the enemy is an irregular force, its COG is unstable. In Colombia, initially illegal armed groups were the hub of enemy capacity. During more than two decades, thousands of insurgents were killed in combat, but the crisis worsened. Then, the sources of finance were
attacked, but the enemy demonstrated ability to find new kinds of funding: foreign support, kidnapping, drug trafficking, extortion, etc. Now, territorial control has been defined as the nucleus of their power. Guerrillas and paramilitaries increased their zones of influence by force.
Inside the areas under their control they obtained security, resources, popular support and cogovernance with local authorities, extorted through terror. To communicate among zones of influence, they established strategic corridors, moving rapidly and easily to remote areas.
MILITARY CAMPAIGN: " THE PATRIOT PLAN"
The Army Commander, being responsible for the main effort of the war on terrorism, 
CONCLUSION
While much improvement has been made, challenges still remain. As Colombia works to combat the threat of illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, it will require continued cooperation, not only from the United States, but also from the international community, to sustain and increase efforts in order to achieve real prosperity and lasting peace. The success of the new Colombian strategy depends on the continuity of the policy of the current administration. This is a long-term process that requires several presidential terms to consolidate a coherent security strategy. Implementation of a permanent state policy must supplant previous government policies applied temporarily in Colombia, which only attained transitory results.
Plan Colombia has brought more than four years of successful US-Colombia cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. This success has several explanations, most notably the commitment by both the United States and Colombia to combine resources and share the burden to combat narco-terrorism. Both countries have invested considerable funds.
To date, the U.S. has provided over US$2.5 billion in military, economic and humanitarian assistance and the Colombian Government has spent nearly US$4.9 billion of its own funds to support Plan Colombia.
The U.S-Colombia partnership against drugs and terror has gained considerable momentum, with positive outcomes in many areas. 28 In order to ensure these results are sustained, Plan Colombia programs must continue in the long term, incorporating new supporters inside the international community, especially the countries affected by consumption.
As a transnational threat, drug trafficking and terrorism must be treated with priority in the international agenda to deter and defeat this dangerous threat. A sudden discontinuation of programs would be detrimental to the positive trends of reducing drugs and violence.
The next phases of Plan Colombia must focus on consolidating its successes in the fight against drugs and concentrate increasingly on dismantling the terrorist organizations that are behind the drug trade.
The National Security Strategy of the US states:
In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic security to the Colombian people.
29
This position marks a considerable shift in US policy that had previously not allowed using Plan Colombia resources against narcoterrorist groups, despite the fact that Colombian authorities had demonstrated the link between terrorists and drug trafficking. If these resources are employed against terrorist groups, the Colombian Armed Forces will increase their combat power, and improve the operational results against terrorism and narco-trafficking.
The success in drug eradication policy has changed the dynamic of the conflict, and may also require a shift in resources to other areas. As the elimination of coca and poppy advances with greater results, it will be important to continue to improve the justice system to effectively bring the leaders of terrorist and drug organizations to justice. Social reconstruction in areas affected by the actions of terrorist groups will continue to be necessary, in order to ensure they do not revert to previous conditions.
Colombia's endeavor in conserving its natural environment is a major responsibility for the Colombian people, and for the rest of the world as well. As Colombia works to stop the destruction of its tropical forests -especially its portion of the Amazon Basin-for the production and manufacturing of illegal drugs, it will require extensive cooperation and support from the United States and the international community to preserve this important part of the Colombian patrimony.
The military is not the only solution to this crisis. These extraordinary operational results need to be complemented with political, social and economical programs to solve the deeplyrooted causes of the conflict. An integrated action that creates unity of effort is essential to involve all the elements of national power to definitely win this war.
The Clausewitzian concept of the "Remarkable Trinity" has been valid in the Colombian conflict. In consequence, emotion, chance and rational policy as related to the people, the army and the government, must be integrated in a well-balanced effort to thrive in war. The success achieved so far by the current Colombian strategy, in integrating the efforts of the people, the Armed Forces and the government against the narcoterrorist groups, has echoed in these words: "Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets".
30
It is too early to declare victory. The final solution is still far away, but each day the end is closer and the Colombian national strategy is proceeding in the right direction. Only with a sustained and determined effort will a permanent peace be achieved. 2 La Violencia began on April 9, 1948 with the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, leader of liberal Party. In the decade that followed, armed followers of the Liberal and Conservative parties mobilized in the countryside in a bloody struggle ; more than 150,000 people were killed.
